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Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Mauritian Slave Auctions

Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Mauritian Slave Auctions

AuthorP. St-Amour, D. Georges and D. Vencatachellum
JournalReview of Economic Studies
Date1 jan. 2009
CatégorieAcademic Publications
Volumevol. 76(4), 1269-1295

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