The Price of Law: The Case of the Eurozone Collective Action Clauses

AuthorS. Ongena, E. Carletti, P. Colla, G. M. Gulati
JournalThe Review of Financial Studies
Date25 Nov. 2021
CategoryAcademic Publications
Volume34(12)
Page numbers5933–5976

We analyze the price effect of the introduction of collective action clauses (CACs) in newly issued sovereign bonds of eurozone countries as of January 1, 2013. By allowing a majority of creditors to modify payment obligations, such clauses reduce the likelihood of holdouts, while facilitating strategic default by the sovereign. We find that CAC bonds trade in the secondary market at lower yields than otherwise similar no-CAC bonds. The yield differential widens in countries with worse ratings and in those with stronger legal systems, especially if of midrange quality. Hence, CACs are seen as pro- rather than anticreditor provisions.